Components of Safety Instrumented Function

Como-SIF
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Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) play a crucial role in ensuring the safety and integrity of industrial processes. Each SIF is composed of three primary subsystems: sensors, a logic solver, and final elements. Understanding the structure and operation of these components is essential for effective safety management.

1. Sensor Subsystem

The sensor subsystem provides the input data required for the SIF to function. These sensors detect specific parameters at various points in the process. Some common parameters measured by sensors include:

  • Process conditions such as pressure, temperature, flow, level, density, pH, and conductivity.
  • Equipment malfunctions, including vibration, temperature, and axial displacement.
  • Flame detection inside fired heaters.
  • Proximity detection to prevent injury from moving machinery.

Sensor Functionality

Sensors generate an analog value (process variable or PV) within a defined range. This measurement can be used to trigger the SIF in several ways:

  • Threshold-based activation: The SIF is triggered when the PV crosses a defined setpoint.
  • Rate of change detection: The SIF activates if the PV changes rapidly beyond a set threshold.
  • Invalid PV detection: If the PV is outside the sensor’s range, the system may detect an instrument malfunction.

Use of Multiple Sensors

In many cases, multiple sensors are used to determine when a SIF should activate. Common methods include:

  • Voting schemes (MooN architecture): For example, in a 2oo3 (two out of three) configuration, the SIF activates when at least two of the three sensors detect an issue.
  • Differential measurements: The SIF is triggered if the difference between two sensor readings exceeds a specified value.
  • Deviation measurements: The SIF is activated when two sensors provide readings that deviate beyond an acceptable range.

Other inputs that may trigger a SIF include:

  • Discrete signals indicating equipment status (e.g., a motor trip signal).
  • Limit switches indicating valve positions.
  • Fire and gas detection sensors.
  • Commands from other SIFs or emergency stop buttons.

2. Logic Solver Subsystem

The logic solver is the central processing unit of the SIF. It determines whether the system should take safety action based on sensor input. Typically, it consists of a safety-rated Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), which is programmed with the logic required for the SIF’s operation.

Functions of the Logic Solver

  • Data processing: Interprets input signals from sensors.
  • Decision making: Determines when to activate the SIF.
  • Output control: Sends commands to the final elements to execute safety actions.
  • Fault detection: Monitors system performance and detects errors.

Physically, the logic solver usually consists of:

  • A safety PLC mounted in a cabinet.
  • An Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) to ensure reliability.
  • Input/Output (I/O) modules for sensor and final element connections.
  • Secure communication systems for diagnostics and monitoring.

The logic solver should be dedicated to safety instrumented functions (SIS) and operate on high-integrity software to prevent failures.

3. Final Element Subsystem

The final elements are the components that execute the safety action when triggered by the logic solver. The most common types of final elements include:

Actuated Valves

Actuated valves are often used to mitigate process hazards by:

  • Releasing pressure to a safe location (blowdown or emergency depressurization valves).
  • Cutting off the flow of hazardous substances.
  • Preventing overpressure downstream (shutdown valves).

These valves operate using pneumatic, hydraulic, or electric actuators.

  • Spring-return actuators: Move to a predefined safe position when power is lost.
  • Double-acting actuators: Require continuous power to operate in both directions.

The valve’s fail position (fail-open, fail-closed, or fail-last) depends on the required safety action and the consequence of a spurious trip.

Motor Control Circuits

The SIF may control motors to:

  • Stop pumps or compressors to prevent damage.
  • Shut down fans or material-handling equipment.
  • Start firewater pumps in emergency scenarios.

Other Final Elements

  • Alarms: Notify operators of unsafe conditions, requiring manual intervention.
  • Software actions: Activate further safety measures via process control systems.
  • Fire suppression systems: Trigger automatic fire control measures.

Importance of Accurate SIF Architecture

Defining the correct SIF architecture is critical for ensuring safety and reliability. Common architectures include:

  • 1ooN (One-out-of-N): The SIF activates when any one of the N initiators detects a problem.
  • NooN (N-out-of-N): The SIF activates only if all N initiators detect a problem.
  • MooN (M-out-of-N): The SIF activates when at least M out of N initiators detect a problem (e.g., 2oo3).

Misunderstanding the SIF architecture can lead to incorrect reliability assessments. For example, a 2oo4 SIF has much stricter reliability requirements than a 2oo20 SIF, as it allows fewer component failures before compromising functionality.

References: 

Functional Safety from Scratch by Peter Clarke xSeriCon

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